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Patrol plans have been developed for use by Motor Gun-
boats to counter small scale infiltration by insurgents from
the sea. The objective in developing the patrol plans was
to determine the optimum deployment of the generally limited
number of patrol craft available to developing nations.
The patrol plan to be used is determined by a probability
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I. INTRODUCTION
Emerging and developing nations today generally face a
host of problems. In addition to internal political con-
flict, these nations are now threatened by internal sub-
version encouraged and assisted by outside nations. The
movement of insurgents has often been closely tied to the
sea because men, arms and supplies can land clandestinely
over beaches. To reduce internal subversion, the develop-
ing nation needs the means to prevent the shipment of men
and arms by sea where such shipment is possible.
The purpose of this paper is to develop patrol plans
for PGM's, allied class, to be used in patrolling the coastal
waters of the nation which possesses these craft in order to
prevent entry or departure by sea of insurgents.
The paper is arranged in five sections. The first Sec-
tion looks at the infiltration by sea from the point of view
of the internal subversion within developing countries
which is encouraged and assisted by outside nations. The
second section deals with the characteristic of the motor
gunboat (PGM) . The third section discusses the concept of
patrol operations, the definition of an operational area
and the units to be employed to support a partol operation.
The forth section discusses the design considerations in
the patrol plan for PGM. In particular, it dwells on methods
of computing the allocation of patrol effort to the assigned

areas of a barrier patrol. The final section provides the
important conclusions from the materials in this paper.

II. INFILTRATION FROM THE SEA
The world situation is characterized by rapid social,
economic, and political changes. These conditions have
created some problems in the maintenance of internal secu-
rity for many developing nations in Africa, Southeast Asia,
and Latin America. The situation is further compounded by
the fact that Communist countries are attempting to promote
subversion and insurgency in many of the developing nations
in these areas. The problems of internal defense are dif-
ficult for any nation to solve. The coastlines of some
countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are extensive
and in many instances, their frontiers run through areas of
rugged terrain making them difficult to patrol.
A. INSURGENCY SUPPLY ROUTES
When a country has internal conflict, the primary tar-
gets of subversion and insurgency are the internal security
forces of the nation; that is, the civilian police forces,
the paramilitary forces, and the military forces. The in-
surgents need arms, are well educated, and have trained men
to achieve their purposes. In order to have well educated
and trained men, the insurgents need schools to train cadre
in the tactics, techniques, and strategy of insurgent op-
erations and methods; most frequently these schools are

located in a foreign nation, outside of the area of con-
flict. After training, these men can be expected to try-
to infiltrate back to the area of conflict by .the easiest
route. Arms are also collected and supplied from the for-
eign nation. The most economical and direct routes for
supply when they are available are sea routes. When in-
surgents can resupply men and arms by sea they will likely
do so.
B. INSURGENCIES SUPPLIED BY SEA IN THE PAST
Since World War II an unprecedented number of insurgen-
cies have occurred throughout the world, may have been in-
stigated or aided by other nations. The following six
2listed insurgencies involved resupply by sea.
Malaya (1948-1960): The long and irregular coastline
of Malaya posed an entrance problem. Many small craft plied
those coastal waters. The British Navy assumed operational
control of all offshore as well as inshore patrols and was
assisted by police launches. The primary objective was to
intercept possible Communist reinforcements by sea and to
prevent the smuggling of arms and ammunition into the
country. The British Government and the Royal Navy main-
tained that these patrols deterred the Communists from
Jerry M. Tinker, Andrew R. Molnar, and John 0. Lenoir,
Strategies of Revolutionary Warfare
,




2Adrain H. Jones, et al , Internal Defense Against Insur
g e n c y : Six Cases , Washington, 1). C. , Center for Research
in Social System, The American University, 1966.

dispatching reinforcements from China by sea. Infrequently,
however, small groups of Communists did land at remote coves
and inlets.
The Philippines (1946-1954): Although there are 14,000
miles of coastline in the Philippines, preventing the supply
by sea of the Huk insurgents with arms and equipment from
outside the country never became a problem for the internal
security forces to combat. This fact worked to the advan-
tage of the Government, since the Huks had only a limited
number of small arms.
.
Cuba (1953-1959) : One of the most difficult problems
faced by the Government internal security forces was that
of the interception of shipments of arms, munitions, equip-
ment and other supplies destined for the insurgents. Sup-
plies received from outside the area were intercepted by
the Government. In addition to receiving supplies by boat,
the insurgents also cleared landing strips to receive sup-
plies shipped by air from foreign countries.
Venezuela (1960-1965): Cuba was being used as a sanc-
tuary where insurgents were trained and where shipments of
supplies and arms originated. One of the difficult prob-
lems which confronted the Government was the prevention of
the infiltration of men, arms, and munitions into the
country.
Algeria (1954-1962): The lengthy coastline and common
boarders with Tunisia and Morocco posed a problem for the
French. Numerous small crafts engaged in supplying arms,
10

munitions, and supplies to the insurgents. On October 16,
1956, French Naval units stopped and boarded the ship Atos
off the Cap de Trois -Fourches , a point near the Moroccan-
Algerian border. The cargo, a consignment of 70 tons of
arms, was confiscated.
South Vietnam (1954-1965): One of the difficult prob-
lems in the counter-insurgency effort was the control of
the entry of personnel and supplies into South Vietnam
both by land and sea. Vital supplies reaching the Viet-
cong by sea included medicines, maps, and propaganda equip-
ment in addition to arms and ammunition.
In summary, in the Philippines and Malaya, coastal
access was effectively controlled. In these two insurgen-
cies the government forces were victorious. In Algeria and
Cuba the aid received by the insurgents by coastal and
other external access was substantial; in both instances
the insurgents were victorious. In South Vietnam insurgent
aid was received from outside the country through coastal
and external access. This insurgency was still in progress
as of June 1974.
C. INFILTRATION TACTICS
Insurgency movements have often been closely tied to
the sea and inland waterways. They have depended on the
sea as a supply route and liaison channel, and on the swamps
and rivers to assure an unobtrusive, sure method of trans-
port and internal communication. Arms and supplies landed
11

clandestinely over beaches or in hidden inlets supplied
insurgency in the Spain of 1808 as well as today's Vietnam.
The insurgent's supplies, orders and equipments can come in
swift patrol boats or innocent looking piroques. Unless
defending forces are intimately familiar with the nature
of normal maritime traffic, the waters which this traffic
occurs in, offers, in effect, a safe haven for infiltrator
surface craft which can "hide in the crowd" of vessels en-
gaged in legitimate business. Control of the waterways has






Current usage of the word "boat" covers much more than
the dictionary definition of "a small open vessel, or water-
craft, usually moved by oars or paddles" and is not limited
to its old nautical usage to cover craft which might be
carried in a ship. There seems to be no precise definition
of what a boat is, or is not. Consideration also has been
limited to those crafts most likely to be used in combat
operations, or in active patrol duties. The largest patrol
crafts built under the U. S. Military Aid Program are the
PGM's-Motor Gunboats. The term motor gunboat is now applied
3primarily to these 117 ton vessels built for allied navies.
A. DISTRIBUTION LIST 4
The first groups of this class, PGM 1-32 were submarine
chasers modified during World War II for U. S. Navy PGM-33
through 38 were wooden-hulled, 143-ton gunboat versions of
the 110-foot subchaser of World War II, completed from 1954
through 1956 for the Philippines. The next group, PGM 39
through 58 welded-steel crafts are lengthened versions of
the U. S. Coast Guard 95-foot Cape-Class low endurance cut-
ters. With ease of maintenance in remote corners of the
3Raymond V. Buckman, J ane's Fighting Ships 1969-1970
, p.
4 76, London, Netherwood , Dalton, 1969.
4Arthur Davidson Baker, IIT, "Small Combatants -1973; II
The Oceanic Powers," United States Naval Institute Proceeding ,
V. 99, p. 240-269, May 19 7 3.
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world particularly in mind, all their machinery and elec-
tronic equipments were selected from commercial sources with
worldwide distribution. Their power and armament were less
than the original U. S. Coast Guard design. PGM 39 through
42, went to the Philippines, and PGM 43 through 46, plus 51
and 52 went to Burma. The Philippine boats had two Mercedes-
Benz diesels, while the crafts for Burma had four Detroit
Diesel engines. The PGM 39 class were originally armed with
ASW ordnance, including depth charges and Mousetraps; they
are now equipped purely as gunboats, the Philippine boats
with two 20 mm AA and the Burmese with two 40 mm guns.
PGM 47 through 50 were the U. S. Offshore Procurement boats
of the Danish Daphne class and little U. S. equipment or
design influence was employed in their construction. Ethiopia
got the next three, PGM 53, 54 and 58, all of the PGM 39
class and completed in 1961-1962; like the others they ini-
tially carried ASW ordnance but now are armed as gunboats.
Beginning with PGM 55 through 57 for Indonesia, the
"MAP-gunboat" underwent a design change. The craft was
lengthened to 101 feet in order to accommodate more men,
more fuel, and more ordnance. The Indonesian crafts were
in a sense intermediate craft, as they carried only two
twin 50 caliber machine guns on completion in 1961. All
later U. S. built boats have carried a 40 mm/60 caliber
Mk 3 gun forward, four 20 mm in a pair of twin mounts after
and two single 50 caliber machine guns beside the bridge
(the boats for Turkey and Iran also carried depth charges
14

and Mouse-trap and are distinguished by having their 40 mm
mount after)
.
The trio of craft for Indonesia and PGM 59 through 70
for South Vietnam were engined with two Mercedes-Benz MB-820
diesels of 975 b.h.p. each. All subsequent PGM 59 class
boats have been powered by the rather unlikely sounding
combination of no less than eight General Motors 6V-71
diesels, geared four per shaft. Two additional diesels in
the single engine room drive the two generator plants. The
ships have a top speed of only about 18 knots. Range at
10 knots is over 1,500 nautical miles.
Further boats of the PGM 59 class have included PGM 71
79, 107, 113 through 117, and 123-124 for Thailand; PGM 72
through 74, 80 through 83, and 91 for South Vietnam; PGM 75
and 76 for Ecuador; PGM 77 for the Dominican Republic;
PGM 78 for Peru (with PGM- 111, a duplicate, built in Peru
with U. S. aid during 1970-1091); PGM 102 for Liberia;
PGM 102, 103, 112 and 122 for Iran; and PGM 104 through 106
and 108 for Turkey. PGM 109 and 100 and 118 through 121
are PGM 39 class craft completed during 1971 in Brazil;
they are armed with an over and under 50 caliber machine
gun/81 mm motor forward and two single machine guns after.
B. SUMMARY OF GUNBOAT CHARACTERISTICS 5
Type: PGM-Motor Gunboat
Class: PGM-39/U.S. Coast Guard 95-feet
Raymond, V. B. Buckman, J ane's Fighting Ships 1971-1972
,
p. 516, London: Netherwood Dalton, 1971.
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Displacement: 110 tons full load
Length 95 feet
Beam: 19 feet
Propulsion: two or four diesels (distribution list)
equal 2,200 b.h.p.
Speed/Range: 20 knots max.; 10 knots = 1,500 nautical
miles
Armament: distribution list
Radar: max. effective range approx. 12 nautical
miles
Countries Operating or Acquiring:
United States: 26 (retained in U.S.C.G.)
Philippines : 4
Burma : 6




South Korea: 9 (ex-U. S . C . G
.
)




Displacement: 130 tons full load
Length: 101 feet
Beam: 22 feet
Propulsion: two Mercedes Benz MB820 diesels = 1,900
b.h.p., or eight G.M. GV-71 diesels
= 2,000 b.h.p.
Speed/Range: 18 knots max.; 10 knots = 1,500 nautical
miles
Armament: normally one 40 mm AA ; two twin 20 mm AA;




Radar: max. effective range approx. 12 nautical
miles










C. TASKS AND MISSIONS
The boats which will perform patrol duties should be
about 100 feet long, displace about 100 tons, have relative-
ly high endurance, be seaworthy, and have all-weather opera-
ting capability. These characteristics were advocated by
Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara.
These statements are based on unclassified sources,
which did not mention the design consideration of the PGMs
.
But the 165-foot PG84 class, the patrol gunboat (PG, formerly
PGM), is the largest patrol-type craft built by the U.S.
Navy since World War II. They were designed to provide
patrol, blockade, surveillance in coastal waters, perimeter
defense for amphibious landings, and support for unconventional




and guerrilla warfare. The PGM cannot perform all of the
PG tasks because she is smaller and has less capabilities
than the PG84 class. The PGMs can, however, perform most
tasks as well as PG84 class when her area of responsibility
is limited to such things as support for unconventional and
o
guerrilla warfare. Commander Andrew G. Nelson, U. S. Navy
stated that "PGMs in our present new construction program
are bound to prove better ships and would be invaluable in
9performing seaward anti-infiltration patrol." So a poten-
tial task and mission of these PGMs is to patrol the coastal
line in order to halt infiltration of men and arms by sea.
This is not inconsistent with the mission of small navies
which is primarily to control coastal waters and to guard
against smuggling and illegal entry or departure by sea.
Richard T. Miller, "Fight Boats of the United States,"





He was assigned to the Naval Advisory Group in Vietnam
from January 1964 to July 1965.
gAndrew G. Nelson and Norman G. Mosher, "Proposed: A
Counterinsurgcncy Task Force," United States Naval Institute




When a sea route exists, supplies, orders and equipments
for insurgents can come in by boats which normally operate
in the area. So the problem of coastal defense exists for
those developing nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America
which have received PGMs under the United States Military
Aid Program. The consideration in Section III concluded
that those craft are suitable for patrol duties. This sec-
tion will develop the concepts which concern the patrol plan
for the PGMs.
A. OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE
The objective of a counter-insurgency patrol is to maxi-
mize the probability of intercepting infiltrators from the
sea. This means that the patrol should be conducted in the
area in which the probability of intercepting an incoming
target is a maximum. A developing nation with a limited
number of patrol craft cannot conduct large scale patrol
operations to prevent insurgency infiltration from the sea
such as the Market Time Operation in Vietnam, 1965-1972,
or the operation of the Royal Navy in the Indonesia Con-
frontation 1962-1968. Both operations used different kinds
The primary mission of Market Time was "to conduct
surveillance, gunfire support, visit and search, and other
operations as directed along the coast of the Republic of
Vietnam in detection and prevention of Communist infiltra-
tion from the sea."
19

of ships and aircraft in significant numbers. The Market
Time Operation consisted of seven Destroyer Escorts, Two
Minesweeper Oceans, two Landing Ships Tank, five Sea Patrol,
26 Patrol Gunmotors and 54 Fast Patrol Crafts. The Royal
Navy Operations in the Strait of Malacca consisted of as
many as fifty ships and small crafts of the Far East Fleet
and companied by the Malasian Navy and Singapore Police
Marine.
The main goal in the design of a barrier patrol is that
the PGMs patrol in an area of maximum probability for the
incoming target. This area is assumed to be determined by
intelligence or by aerial search in the general infiltration
area.
B. OPERATIONAL AREA
The operational or patrol area to be discussed extends
seaward from the coastline about 132 nautical miles and is
bounded by a line about 135 miles long which parallels the
shore line. The location size of an actual area will depend
on intelligence or aerial surveillance information. An
operation area is shown in Figure 1. From the shore line
to 12 nautical miles to seaward are the Visiting and
Boarding area and the PGMs barrier patrol area, Aerial
Search will be assumed to provide the information on which
the probability distribution of incoming target is based.
The Aerial Search area extends from 12 nautical miles to
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aerial patrol, the probability distribution of the barrier
crossing point of an incoming target should be provided by
intelligence agencies. The visiting and boarding operations
are not discussed in this paper. They will depend on the
internal laws of a nation and are a topic worth further
study. The surface patrol operation is the main topic of
this thesis and it will be discussed in detail in the next
section.
C. OPERATIONAL UNIT
The operational patrol unit employed in this paper con-
sists of three PGMs to perform barrier patrol in the opera-
tional area. This is the unit which is the subject of the
patrol plans developed in the next bection. The plans can




A. ESTIMATION OF THE A PRIORI PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF
TARGETS
Patrol tactics will be established in this section. It
is assumed that a patrol will be conducted when information
indicates that there will be small craft carrying men and
armaments approaching some area along the patrolled coast.
This information must come from aerial search or intelli-
gence sources. If the information cannot be used to esti-
mate the a priori probabilities, P., PR and Pp that the
incoming target will cross one of the equal length patrol
barrier segments A, B or C, respectively, then they might
be estimated by using historical data. However, the best
way to locate targets and estimate P., P R and P r presumably
would be to use an aircraft to search in the area of incom-















The following assumptions are made in this section: The
targets are small craft and fishing boats which have the
capability of long range cruising, but whose only naviga-
tional aid is a magnetic compass, so evasive maneuvers such
as zig-zagging cannot be performed. Electronics counter-
measure will not be used, so a target will not know when
ships or aircraft patrols were in its area. A target will
attempt to reach shore before dark in order to locate a
landing area and the landing will occur at night. The tar-
get will not change course until it it close enough to the
shore to identify the landing site, and therefore, the tar-
get will not change course before passing the barrier pa-
trol line.
Based on the above assumptions, an aircraft should con-
duct a regular search in the morning, searching from the
barrier line until the track is 120 miles from the barrier
line in order to ensure that all those targets which would
reach the barrier line before dark would be detected by the
aircraft
.
When a target is detected by the search aircraft's
radar, it will be verified visually. To find P., P R and
P
r ,
the course of each detected target will be plotted and
then a line drawn from the target's position in the direc-
tion of the course to the point where it crosses the bar-
rier line. If a target is observed to be a boat that is
fishing, or if its course line does not cross the barrier
line, it will be classified as a 'false alarm', otherwise,







Suppose the aircraft depicted in Figure A-l detected
targets and that they were as shown in Figure A- 2. Then
there would be four potential insurgents and the a priori
probability of the targets distribution are:
PA
= 2/4 = .5
P
B
= 1/4 = .25
P
c
= 1/4 = .25
where p + p + p =iA B C
If it is estimated that targets will reach the barrier
line at night, the air search should be conducted again in
the evening to ensure that all such targets will be detected
by the air search.
25

The a priori probability P., P R and Pp could be ob-
tained using information from other sources of intelligence.
B. PATROL TACTICS FOR A BARRIER PATROL
Suppose the line to be patrolled is 135 miles long and
12 miles off-shore. And suppose there are three ships avail-
able for patrolling at all times during the operation. The
patrol line will then be divided into three barrier lines,
A, B and C each of length 45 miles.
Now assume the searcher's speed V = 12 knots, the
searcher's sweep width W = 20 miles and the target's speed
U = 8 or 12 knots. (To simplify the analysis, the target's
speed will be classified as 8 knots or 10 knots.)
Since P., P R and P„ be the a priori probability that an
incoming target will cross the barrier A, B or C, respec-
tively, the probability of intercepting an incoming target
is then
P(det) = P(det|A)PA + P(det|B)P fi + P(det|C)P c
where P(det|A) is the probability of detecting a target,
given the target is in A, etc. . .
The probability of interception depends on the patrol
tactics used, and on the distribution of the incoming tar-
gets in the area. Tactics will be developed which maximize
the probability of intercept by the barrier patrol.
1 . Barrier Search Model
There are two types of barrier patrol; crossover
patrol, and back-and- forth patrol [Rcf. 23]. The probability
26

of detection for a crossover patrol will be assumed to be
P(det) = min {1, (1 + rV^
T )/(X*l) } .
Hence, X = L/W where L is the patrol barrier length
and r = V/U.
For a back-and-forth patrol, the probability of detection
will be assumed to be
x
P(det) = <




2 /A(A+l) for r<2/A(A + l)
for r>2/A(A+l)
.
The type of patrol to be used in order to maximize
intercept will depend on A and r. By looking at the graph
of Figure B-l, "Region of effectiveness of back-and-forth
and crossover plan" [Ref . 23] , which compares the probability
of detection for these two types of patrols, the type of
patrol to be used can be determined which maximizes the
probability of detection.
a. Patrol Plans
The following patrol plans are based on the
relevant barrier search models and the a priori probabili-
ties associated with the targets. Target crossing points
will be assumed to be uniformly distributed across a bar-
rier segment.
Case I
In this case, the probability of a target
crossing barrier A is approximately equal to that of it
27

ARegion of effectiveness of back-and- forth and crossover plans
Figure B-l.
crossing barrier B or barrier C. In this case, the search
















45 ' x 45
Distance in miles
The three barrier lengths are chosen to be 35
miles which provides an overlap of 5 miles at each end.
Take, P
A Pn Po
= 1/3 and note A 35/20 1. 75.
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Given U = 10 knots, then r = 12/10 = 1.2, and
one finds that a back-and-forth patrol is better than a
crossover patrol. Now set
P = P(det|A) = P(det|B) = P(det|C),
then
P = 1 - (1.75 - /1,44 * 1 -l-i- )*/l. 75(1. 75 + 1
= .55.
And
P(det) = P-PA + P-P B + P-Pc = .55(PA + Pg + P c )
=
.55.
Given U = 8 knots, then r = 12/8 = 1.5, and
again a back-and-forth patrol is better than a crossover
patrol. Then






In this case, the probability of an incoming
target crossing barrier A is approximated equal to that
crossing barrier B and greater than that of crossing bar-
rier C. It would be better to use three ships to patrol
barrier A and B if the probability of intercept were greater
than it would be if a single ship were assigned to each




called the 1 patrol plan. Whether or not this is so de
pends on the relative size of P~ compared to P. and P R .
The new patrol plan which will be called the 2 patrol
















3£ ' So ^ 30 ^ V5"
Distance in miles
X = 20/20 - 1
Given U = 10 knots, then r = 12/10 = 1.2, and
back-and-forth patrols are better than crossover patrols.
Then




P(det) = P(PA + P B ) = -74(PA + P fi )
,nd
For the 2 patrol plan to be better than the
i s t1 one wants
74(P A P R ) > .55(P A + P R + P r )A B A B C-
P + P u > .55/. 74 = .74.A B
30

So use the 2 patrol plan when P. + P~ > .74 or
P
c
< .26 given U = 10 knots.
Given U = 8 knots, then r = 12/8 = 1.5, and
crossover patrols are better than back-and- forth patrols,
then
P = (1 -
1,5
^5 + i"




P(det) = -84(PA + PB ).
For the 2 patrol plan to be better than the








PA + PB > .62/. 84
=
.74
or P„ < .26.
Case III
In this case, the probability of an incoming
target crossing barrier A approximately equal that of cross
ing barrier B and is smaller than that of crossing barrier
C. Suppose there are two ships which patrol in barrier A
and one ship which patrols in barrier B and C, this will
rdbe called the 3 patrol plan. We will now find the value
of P., P
p
and P„ which will yield a probability of inter-
cept for patrol plan 3 which is greater than that for
















Barrier A: Two patrol segments each 12.5 miles
long with X
1
= 12.5/20 = .625.
Barrier B: One patrol segment of 80 miles
with X
2
= 80/20 = 4.
Given U = 10 knots, then r = 12/10 = 1.2, and
in barrier A crossover patrols are better while in barrier
B plus C a back-and-forth patrol is better. Then,






















For the 3 patrol plan to be better than the
st
1 patrol plan, one wants:




















< .35/. 63 = .55
or PA > .45.
Given U = 8 knots, then r = 10/8 = 1.5, and in
barrier A, crossover patrols are better while in barrier B


















P(det) = VA + P 2 (PB - Pc ) = PA * .35(PB + P c )
rd
For the 3 patrol plan to be better than the
i st1 one wants
P. + .35(P R + P r ) > .62B
PA





























< .38/. 65 = .58
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or PA > .42.
Case IV
When the density of the incoming target is nearly
the same for A and B and these are much smaller than the
density for C, use all three ships to patrol in barrier A.
The patrol plan, called patrol plan 4 will yield a prob-
ability of interception greater than that for patrol plan 3











Barrier A: Three patrol segments, each = 5 miles long with
X 5/20 = .25.
Given U = 10 knots, then r = 12/10 = 1.2, and







For the 4 patrol plan to be better than the




> .84PA .31(PB P c )
.16PA > .31(PB + P c )












+ V + PB + PC








Given U = 8 knots, then r = 12/8 = 1.5, and
crossover patrols are better in barrier A. Then,
P = 1.
So
P(det) = PP. = P..
For the 4 patrol plan to be better than the
7 rd3 one wants
PA > PA * .35(PB * P )
rd
It is apparent that in this case, the 3 patrol
plan is optimal, because two ships patrolling in this bar-
rier gave a probability of intercept equal 1 already.
Case V
This case can be summarized by P. > P
R
~ P^.
The density of incoming targets is greater at the center
of the barrier line. In this case, one may want to use
patrol plan 5 which consists of two ships to patrol in
barrier B, and the remaining ship patrolling in barrier A
or C if this will yield a probability of intercept greater












Barrier A: 35 miles long with .. = 35/20 = 1.75
Barrier B: Two segments each = 12.5 miles long
with X- = 12.5/20 = .625.
Given U = 10 knots, then r = 12/10 = 1.2, and
in barrier A or C, a back-and-forth patrol is better while
in barrier B, crossover patrols are better. Then,




















For the 5 patrol plan to be better than the
1 , one wants:
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' ^"Pfi + P B + P C













+ V PB < i- 06
















> 1/2.06 = .49.
Given U = 8 knots, then r = 12/8 z 1.5, and in
barrier A or C, a back-and- forth patrol is better while in
barrier B, crossover patrols are better. Then






















For the 5 patrol plan to be better than the
1 st
1 , one wants :
.62P
A
+ Pg > .62
P
A













































> 1/2.2 = .45
Case VI
This case can be summarized by P. ~ P
r
> P R .
When the density of incoming targets is smaller at the
center of the barrier line, one should shift the patrol ship
from barrier B to barrier A or C rather than use plan 1 if
P R is smaller than the value found below. This will be













The condition for using plan 6 is found in the
same way as in Case V.
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Given U = 10 knots. Then,

















< .53/2.53 = .21.




B V PB > i/' 6


















< .6/2.6 = .23.
Case VII
This case is summarized by P. > P R > P r or
Pg > P- > P. or P„ > P. > P
R
etc. In this case, one should
shift the patrol ship from C to A under the same conditions














a/ P C > 1 /- 6 1.7, for U - 8 knots,





The modified patrol plan will be called plan 7













The patrol ship in B should be shifted to A as
shown in the following figure when Pg satisfies the condi-












Given U = 10 knots, then r = 12/10, and a cross





P(det) = PPA = PA .
For the 8 patrol plan to be used, one wants:
PA > .84PA .55PB
.16PA > .55P fi
PA/PB > 3.4.
The plan should also be applied in the case
PR
z P. ~ P with appropriate modification when PR/P A ~
V P C > 3 - 4 -
Given U = 8 knots. Then, r = 12/8 = 1.5, and
a crossover patrol is best. Then
P = 1.
So
P(det) = PPA = PA .
To use plan 8, one wants
P > P - 62P
It is apparent that in this case, one would
never use a three ship patrol in a same barrier because a
two ship barrier in A and one ship barrier in B will yield
a higher probability of interception.
2 . Table for Patrol Plans
The patrol plans and the condition for these use
Tables I and II, the tables are designed to be used by a
decision maker or patrol 3 group commander to determine how
to deploy these patrol ships, when the target density across
a barrier is assumed to satisfy the specified conditions
41

distribution. The targets are classified into two classes,
low speed targets with speeds of approximately 8 knots, and
high speed targets with speeds of approximately 10 knots.
In each case, the following values have been used in
computation.
Patrol craft's speed V = 12 knots
Sweep width W = 20 miles
Overlap at the end of






= 1 with the
densities constant in each sector.
It has been assumed that there will always be three
ships available for patrol during the time of operation.
For other than three ships, patrol plans could be
established by using the same procedures as were used here.
42









p ~p ~p 55
PA=PB>P c Cor P B*PC>PA )
>
c
< .26 (or PAPr . < .26) 2a
•74(PA * PB )
(greater than plan 1)
PA>PB,Pc (or PC>PB=PA )
1. PA>.45(or P c >.45)
2. PA>.67(or P c>.67)
3
4
.84PA+.31(P B +P C )(greater than plan 1)












or . 5 5P^+ .84P
B
(greater than plan 1)
P
B













(greater than plan 1)





P / P *3 4







(greater than plan 1)
P
A
(greater than plan 5)
Note: Sec Appendix for description of patrol plan
A \














< .26 (or PA <.26) 2b
.84(PA P B )
(greater than plan 1









PA > .42 (or Pc > .42) (greater than plan 1)
P >P ~P
*B





























(greater than plan 1)




Patrolling coastlines against infiltration by sea is one
of the problems of developing countries. Six insurgency
cases studied from the past suggest that if government forces
can control supply from the sea, then the government forces
will be victorious but if government forces cannot control
supply from the sea, then the insurgent forces will be
victorious. Most developing countries are short of patrol
crafts. However, some have PGMs which were transferred
from the United States Navy under the Military Assistance
Program. They are suitable for patrol against unconven-
tional and guerilla warfare. This paper's intent is to
show how to maximize the utility of these patrol crafts in
barrier patrol operations. Appendix A is a summary of














Each ship patrols back-and- forth in each barrier with
equal search length of 35 miles.
Plan 2a
P "^P >P












Three ships patrol back- and- forth in two adjacent bar-












Symmetric Crossover Patrol [Ref,
9 = Sin" 1 U/V
ab = 20 sec - cd
be = 20 tan = da

Three ships patrol with crossover patrol in two adjacent











Two ships use a crossover patrol in one barrier with
equal search length 12.5 sec9 miles each and the remaining
ship use a back-and-forth patrol in the remaining adjacent










A or P c>> PA^V
Three ships crossover patrol in one barrier A, B or C







Two ships use a crossover patrol in barrier B with
equal search length of 12.5 secO miles. The remaining ship
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uses a back-and-forth patrol in barrier A or C with a search
length of 35 miles. (The remaining ship patrols in A or C
by randomly choosing A or C in each period,- e.g., flip a











Two ships use a crossover patrol in barrier A or C with
equal search length 12.5 sec0 miles and the remaining ship
uses a back-and-forth patrol in barrier A or C with search
length of 35 miles. Barrier A or C are randomly chosen













Two ships use a crossover patrol in the barrier with
the greatest probability density with equal search lengths
of 12.5 secB miles the remaining ship uses a back-and-forth
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